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SUMMARY
This paper studies airline customers’ online search and purchase behaviors.
Two fundamental aspects of online behavior are examined: (1) the link between
search behavior and buying behavior and (2) the evolution of inter-temporal search
and purchase decisions of strategic buyers.
In the first study, we examine online customers’ dynamic conversion behaviors us-
ing clickstream data. A new model based on Markov chains that incorporates discrete
choices and decision-timing is proposed to capture key search effects on consumer de-
cisions as well as dynamics of browsing behavior both within and across visits. Empir-
ical results show that within-site search activities lead to strong consumer engagement
and thus increase purchase and revisit propensities. Fit comparison between first and
second order Markov chains allows us to conclude that consumer decisions are pri-
marily influenced by the current search. Furthermore, we observe that consumers
dynamically adjust their browsing behavior both within and across visits.
The second study investigates the evolution of inter-temporal search and purchase
decisions of strategic buyers. Risk neutral buyers follow simple behavioral rules based
on future and current prices and options available. We show that the trade-off be-
tween waiting and purchasing will become less and less favorable to waiting. Price
elasticity should therefore drop as departure date approaches. With stationary price
distributions, search and purchase efforts increase with proximity to the deadline. We
extend the base model to allow for price evolution and demand uncertainty. We find
that increases in mean price and price dispersion may attenuate increasing propensi-
ties for search and purchase. We demonstrate our models through a logit estimation
on a unique data set from a major online travel agency.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, airlines have faced increasing revenue pressures due to the increased
market penetration of low cost carriers, and the prevalence of internet sales. In this
competitive environment, some legacy airliners have begun to investigate the viability
of offering discount products targeted to highly flexible travelers. The first study uses
data from a website that offers customers discount on a known airline and market in
exchange for travel date and flight uncertainty. Specifically, the ability to track the
sequence of screens viewed by customers, as well as identify repeat visitors provides a
unique opportunity to model search and purchase behavior of time-flexible travelers.
This paper builds on prior work in the area of airline search and purchase behaviors
by (1) proposing the search effects within and across visits on consumer engagement
(2) relating the consumer stickiness to a series of consumer decisions on page request,
purchase and revisit, and (3) providing a comprehensive view on consumer decisions
and decision cycles.
We conceptualize consumer navigation within the site as a series of the following
decisions: (1) whether to request an additional page or to exit the site (exit deci-
sion), (2) whether to purchase once ending the search (purchase decision), and (3)
whether to come back after ending the search without purchase (revisit decision).
We associate these decisions with the differential effects of search activities within
and across visits. We estimate a discrete choice model of consumer decisions on the
clickstream data. Our modeling results verify the key effects on the consumer de-
cisions and provide several findings about browsing behavior. Furthermore, discrete
1
consumer decisions are incorporated with proportional hazard models of decision-
timing through a continuous Markov chain model, which provides a comprehensive
and simultaneous perspective on decisions and durations.
Key findings fall into one of two clusters: key search effects on consumer decisions
and dynamics of browsing behavior both within and across visits. First, our results
indicate that page request and purchase decisions are driven by search depth and long
page-view time. Moreover, repeated visits and short inter-visit durations increase
purchase and revisit propensities. Along with these within-site search effects, higher
price discounts lead to strong consumer engagement. In addition, we have verified
that price effects are exogenous, that is, the price offers consumers receive are not
affected by search depth and durations. Fit comparison between first and second
order continuous Markov chain models allows us to conclude that consumer choices
are primarily influenced by the current search, independent of the past searches.
Next, we find that consumers dynamically adjust their browsing behavior both
within and across visits. Among our findings in browsing dynamics, there first is
evidence for time constraints or learning effects in both browsing components (page
requests and page-view duration) as consumers go deeper into the site. Second,
our results are consistent with the presence of two distinct categories of consumer
behaviors: goal-oriented and experiential consumptions that spill over multiple visits.
Consumers who revisit after relatively short durations are likely to be more goal-
oriented than consumers who revisit after relatively longer intervals. Moreover, goal-
oriented consumer behaviors lead to, if any occur, immediate purchase and stronger
engagement within the site.
In the second study, we investigate search and purchase behavior in market with
perishable goods. Markets of this kind include hotel rooms, newspapers, airline tickets
and sports and artistic events. The necessity of search due to costly information
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acquisition have shown to be fundamental in explaining price dispersion and non-
competitive pricing as well as unemployment and real effects of monetary policy. This
paper exploits a unique data set on search and purchase behavior from an internet
search engine.
Our investigation allows us to test some implications of standard optimal stopping
problems and discuss some limitations of the current literature on revenue manage-
ment. In particular, we show that given the variability of prices, engaging in search
is optimal. Or equivalently, that there are strategic reasons to continue searching for
a good price. A basic property of the model, however, is that under mild conditions
on preferences the trade-off between waiting and purchasing will become less and
less favorable to waiting. Price elasticity should therefore drop as departure date
approaches. Consistent with this, we find that demand becomes more inelastic as
deadline approaches.
Recently Horner and Samuelson (2008) have shown that a monopolist willing to
sell a perishable good to a buyer with unknown valuation of the good might engage
in dynamic price discrimination. I.e., monopolists without commitment capacity
might still extract some rents from consumers. The main conclusion of the paper,
which resembles the results on the revenue management literature (Gallego and Ryzin
(1993)), is that the optimal sequence of prices will be a decreasing one. This is so
because monopolists become more and more pessimistic as time passes since buyers
with higher valuations will likely buy early. The result from Horner and Samuelson
(2008) is important because it shows that the basic result of the revenue management
literature holds even if buyers can search or wait for a better price. The model we
develop in this paper has the same property, higher valuation buyers tend to leave
the market early.
While the result that the optimal policy for a monopolist is to successively shave
prices as deadline approaches is robust to search behavior, it contradicts observed
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empirical evidence. Prices and its dispersion, in the airline industry, tend to rise as
deadline approaches. Consumers would therefore increase their search and purchase as
deadline approaches. The data reveal that search does increase as deadline approaches
but that purchases given searches decline. Since search is an expression of the gains
from searching or the potential benefits of purchasing, this behavior is only explicated
by the presence of a small probability of finding unusually low prices. This would
simultaneously explain the increase in the expected gain from trade together with the
lower success ratio after search.
In order the reconcile the behavior in prices and search and purchase, we extend
the basic search model to include demand uncertainty. As shown by Dana (1998),
demand uncertainty justifies the use of price sequences that are increasing as deadline
approaches and also predicts that unusually low prices might occur with small prob-
ability. Theoretically, the inclusion of demand uncertainty do not change the basic
properties of the model since demand uncertainty basically means left-ward shift in
the distribution of consumer valuation in earlier periods. If anything, demand uncer-
tainty heightens the fact that demand will become more price inelastic as deadline
approaches.
4
CHAPTER II
MARKOV CHAIN MODEL FOR DYNAMIC SEARCH
AND PURCHASE BEHAVIORS
2.1 Theory
We seek to model search and purchase decisions in an e-commerce site. The decision
variable of interest is (1) whether to request an additional page or to exit the site,
(2) whether to purchase once ending the search, and (3) whether to revisit after
leaving without purchase. We build a dynamic model that attempts to capture the
differential effects of navigation activities on consumer decisions. The key effects we
test in our model are introduced below.
2.1.1 Key Effects
2.1.1.1 Price Effects (Exogenous Factor)
The most prominent effect on consumer decisions– especially on purchasing– is price.
We investigate not only its direct correlation with purchase decisions but also the
overall effects on within-site stickiness. We expect that the lower the offered prices
are, the more engaged consumers are in the site. Strong consumer engagement, of
course, is more likely to end up with purchasing. An important issue associated with
price effects is whether they are exogenous. One might argue that as consumers are
more involved in searches, they are more likely to find better offers, i.e. lower prices.
If this is the case, causality between price and consumer engagement is not obvious.
This paper tests for such endogenous relationships.
While measuring the price effects, we assume that consumers are knowledgeable
5
about other alternatives and use the lowest price offered by other sellers as an anchor-
ing reference price. Consumer decisions are made by assessing prices as discounts or
surcharges relative to this reference price. We believe these assumptions are reason-
able because: 1) the site where we have collected clickstream data primarily target
highly time-flexible and price-sensitive consumers (leisure travelers). 2)The emer-
gence on-line travel agencies and low cost carriers made the comparison of prices
across both airline competitors and sales channels much easier and faster. 3) Most
important, the use of a reference price for modeling purposes is convenient as we can
control for market-specific effects (e.g., departure/arrival airports, number of connec-
tions, length of connections, flight durations, etc.) as well as demand effects (e.g.,
seasonality, holidays, etc.). The use of a reference price is also consistent with the
methodology used by other researchers, most notably for Travelocity’s “Good-Day-
to-Buy” sales campaigns (Smith, et al., 2007).
C1. Higher discount rates lead to stronger consumer engagement.
2.1.1.2 Behavioral Effects (Endogenous Factor)
(a) Intra-visit Exposure Effects
Prior research on repetition effects in marketing suggest two different patterns
of consumer response to repeated exposures within the same web visit (e.g.
see Buchanan and Morrison (1988), Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Hoffman and
Novak (1996)). The first pattern posits that response probability decreases
over time (wear-out). The second response pattern holds that initial response
probability may be low, but increases with repetition to a maximum level (wear-
out). In the initial wear-in stage, increased response opportunity with each
additional searches lead to an increase in affect. Subsequently, satiation (or
tedium) leads to wear-out, when each additional exposure after wear-in has a
significant negative effect.
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We hypothesize that wear-in dominates in on-line search and purchase behav-
iors so that consumers are even more engaged within the site as they request
additional pages and spend more time in the site. The rationale for this fol-
lows from the fact that airline passengers (especially leisure travelers) of our
interest are price elastic and are willing to navigate web sites to find a better
alternative. Moreover, the Internet environment reduces consumer search costs,
which makes consumers search more. Thus, we expect that the more pages con-
sumers request and the longer consumers spend in viewing pages, the stronger
consumers are engaged in the site.
C2. The positive effect on consumer engagement due to wear-in may dominate
over negative effects due to wear-out.
– C2-1. More page requests reinforce consumer engagement.
– C2-2. Longer page view time reinforces consumer engagement.
(b) Exposure Effects across Visits
Many researchers including Chatterjee et al. (2003), Hoffman and Novak (1996),
and Moe (2003), discuss two distinct categories of consumption behavior: goal-
oriented (directed) and experiential (exploratory) behaviors. We expect that
these consumer behaviors are captured through inter-visit activities. Consumers
who revisit after relatively short durations are likely to be more goal-oriented
than consumers who revisit after relatively longer intervals. Moreover, goal-
oriented consumer behaviors lead to, if any occur, immediate purchase and
stronger engagement within the site.
C3. Inter-visit behaviors indicate two distinct consumer populations– goal-
oriented and experiential consumers.
– C3-1. Revisit reflects more goal-oriented consumers (stronger consumer
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engagement).
– C3-2. Shorter inter-visit time reflects more goal-oriented consumers (stronger
consumer engagement).
2.1.2 Consumer Decisions
We conceptualize customer navigation as a series of the following binary decisions: (1)
whether to request an additional page or to exit the site (exit decision), (2) whether
to purchase once ending the search (purchase decision), and (3) whether to come back
after ending the search without purchase (revisit decision). We can associate these
decisions with the differential effects discussed in the previous section. Purchase and
revisit decisions are clearly driven by consumer commitment and loyalty whereas an
exit decision is an obvious consequence of consumer disengagement. Therefore, we
expect same effects on purchase and revisit decisions and the opposite effect in an
exit decision.
E. Strong consumer engagement leads to purchase and revisit decisions.
- E1. Purchase and revisit decisions move in the same direction (stronger con-
sumer engagement).
- E2. Exit decisions (disengagement) move in the opposite direction to purchase
and revisit.
Specifically, we anticipate high discount rates lead to consumer engagement, and
thus increase purchase and revisit propensities while decreasing exit propensities.
Additional page requests and long page-view durations are supposed to have negative
impacts on exit decisions and positive impacts on purchase and revisit. The expected
correlations between key effects and consumer decisions are listed in Figure 1.
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Table 1: Key effects and expected relations to consumer decisions
Disengagement Engagement
Effects Exit Purchase Revisit
C1. Discount Rates - + +
C2-1. Page Requests - + +
C2-2. Page-View Durations -
C3-1. Repeated Visits - + +
C3-2. Inter-visit Durations + - -
2.1.3 Dynamics of Browsing Behavior
We theorize that consumer browsing patterns characterized by intra-visit factors (page
request, page view durations) and inter-visit factors (repeated visits, inter-visit time)
have differentiated effects on consumer engagement and decision. In the analysis of
those effects, we face the following questions: Is each effect related with other effects?
Does the interaction between effects, if any, reinforce the corresponding effects or
attenuate them? How do we interpret the relations? In this section, we discuss the
dynamics of consumer navigation patterns.
2.1.3.1 Intra-visit Dynamics
A proper question on intra-visit dynamics is whether search depth reduces the page
view durations or not. We may hypothesize two opposite patterns - time constraints
(or learning) and involvement. Bucklin et. al. (2003) and Mandel and Johnson
(2002) point out a change in browsing behavior can be a response to the salience of
time constraints, which may vary as a visitor browses the site or may be the result of
varying degrees of involvement with the site or with tasks being performed. Johnson,
Bellman, and Lohse (2003) study the duration of Web site sessions across multiple
visits. Using session durations from a panel of Internet users, Johnson, Bellman, and
Lohse test learning phenomenon. Results indicate that visitors spend less time per
session the more they visit the site, which in turn suggests that they become more
efficient as they return to the site. If there were time constraints on Internet usage at
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the individual level, we expected search depth to have negative effects on page-view
duration. In contrast, if visitors became more involved as they requested more pages,
we expected search depth to be associated with longer page-view durations. We
investigate which pattern– time constraint or involvement– dominates in consumer
navigation behaviors.
B1. If engagement dominates over time-constraint (or learning) in intra-visit
behaviors, page-view duration becomes longer as number of pages.
2.1.3.2 Inter-visit Dynamics
We can also hypothesize two opposite browsing patterns that spill over across visits–
learning and involvement. When consumers accumulate the knowledge on within-site
alternatives as well as the outside options, and can use the knowledge they acquired
in one visit for subsequent visits, they may need less time to come back as they
repeatedly visit. The inter-visit time may be shortened over repeated visits. In
contrast, repeated visits may imply that consumers may require even more time
before making decisions, in which case the inter-visit time will increase over repeated
visits. Our proposed modeling approach enables us to investigate how within-site
browsing behavior changes as consumers return to a site.
B2. If engagement dominates over learning in revisit behaviors, inter-visit dura-
tion becomes longer as number of visits.
2.2 Data
The online clickstream data for this research was collected over a two-year period,
from August 2004, to June 2006, and targeted to customers traveling on one of 21
routes between New Zealand, Australia, and/or Fiji. The majority of prices shown
to customers were between NZ $300 and $500, where $500 was approximately equal
to the lowest price offered on a traditional round trip Freedom Air itinerary.
Online clickstream data captures the sequence of web pages viewed by customers.
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We define four terms to describe how clickstream data was used for the analysis. A
search is defined as the combination of two pages: the page in which a customer
inputs search parameters and the page in which the price offered to the consumer is
displayed. A visit is a sequence of pages that a customer requests within a specific
time period to search for a single product (defined as an airline route).
An alternative concept to visit which is often used in the analysis of clickstream
data is a session. It is an identity tag assigned every time a user launches a new
browser. However, we have found that many customers launch several browsers almost
simultaneously and search back and forth over multiple browsers. In order to eliminate
multiple browser effects, we define a visit as a sequence of searches done within
a specific time period regardless of the number of browsers launched. We follow
previous research and industry practice (see e.g. Bucklin and Sismeiro(2003) and
Moe and Fader (2004)) and assume that a page request started a new visit if it was
requested after an idle period of at least 30 minutes. Our data show that time between
page requests falls either within 5 minutes or in more than 30 minutes.
On the other hand, confining searches in a visit is a fairly narrow approach to
consumer behaviors. We observe that a consumer’s decision period may span days,
weeks, or even months over several repeated visits. Moreover, many researchers in-
cluding Bucklin and Sismeiro(2003), Chatterjee et. al.(2003), Johnson et al. (2004),
and Moe and Fader (2004), point out the dynamics of consumer searches across visits
or sessions. Customers’ search and purchase decisions are better characterized as
a sequence of searches over possibly repeated visits. We model customers’ searches
throughout the whole purchase decision cycle (search-exit-revisit-purchase), which
may span up to 6 months. Our data indicate that 90% of purchase cycles fall within
one month.
A cookie is used as a proxy for an individual consumer. As noted by Moe and
Fader (2004), one limitation typically associated with clickstream data is that it is
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difficult to obtain characteristics that identify a particular user. In contrast to the
U.S. where retailers are reticent to trace cookies stored in customers’ computers due
to privacy concerns, New Zealand retailers are much more open to tracking cookies.
This provides us with the opportunity to use cookies to identify and track individual
customers.
In order to clarify these definitions, Table 2.2 and Figure 1 provide an example
of the clickstream data used for this analysis. Each row represents a search that
contains search parameters (route, time window, prior notice) and search results
(price, purchase decision). The customer associated with cookie User1 visits once
and leaves the site after two consecutive searches. This customer does not come back
thereafter and his/her decision cycle ends up with no purchase.
On the other hand, the customer associated with cookie User2 shows more engaged
behaviors. During the first visit, he/she browses three pages and leave the site without
purchasing. Then, he/she comes back shortly after the first visit and purchase. The
decision cycle of User2 is made after five searches that occur across two visits. In
this analysis, we associate customer search behavior with purchase decision cycle and
study the sequence of searches within this cycle in order to explore the dynamics of
customer search and purchase decisions.
Table 2: Example clickstream data
Date Cookie Route Visit No. Search No. Window Notice Price Purchase
08/24/2006 4:10:16 PM User1 BNEHLZ 1 1 120 30 150 No
08/24/2006 4:10:30 PM User1 BNEHLZ 1 2 120 20 130 No
08/25/2006 4:09:40 PM User2 AKLOOL 1 1 30 10 300 No
08/25/2006 4:10:10 PM User2 AKLOOL 1 2 35 10 280 No
08/25/2006 4:10:24 PM User2 AKLOOL 1 3 35 7 275 No
08/25/2006 5:10:15 PM User2 AKLOOL 2 1 30 10 300 No
08/25/2006 5:10:55 PM User2 AKLOOL 2 2 35 10 280 Yes
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the clickstream data used in this study.
Note that most customers visit the site only once. On average, a customer searches
three times throughout the entire visits. The purchase conversion rate per decision
12
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Figure 1: An example of consumer search activities
cycle is approximately 3%. However, customers that ended up purchasing searched,
on average, much more than three times.
Table 3: Summary statistics for clickstream data
Data View Occurrences
Search 42,554
Visit 20,354
Purchase Cycle 15,237
Cookie 12,588
Purchase 474
2.3 Modeling the Consumer Behavior
2.3.1 Customer Utility and Decision
Consumers engage in three sequential stages of binary decisions: (1) whether to
request an additional page or to exit the site, (2) whether to purchase once ending
the search, and (3) whether to come back after ending the search without purchase.
In order to represent the sequence of consumer decisions, we first define customers’
navigation states. At any moment, consumers may “Search”, “Purchase”, be on
temporary “Leave” without purchasing, or leave the site forever with “No Purchase”.
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Starting in state “Search”, a consumer needs to decide whether to search more or not.
If he/she decides to request an additional page, his/her next state remains “Search”.
Once deciding to end search, he/she decides whether to purchase or just leave. On
the former, he/she transits to state “Purchase”. On the latter, he/she move on to
state “Leave”. The last decision is whether to come back or not. Consumers in state
“Leave” may revisit the site and start again in state “Search”. Figure 2 illustrates
how the state changes depending on each decision.
Purchase
(1)PageRequest
-
((
Search
-
(2)Purchaseoooooooooo
77oooooooooo
**
Leave
(3)Revisit
jj

Not Purchase
Figure 2: Page-to-Page transitions
We assume that consumer k has latent utility Uknva in state a on discrete viewing
occasion n of visit v, where there are totals of K consumers, A decisions, Vk visits of
consumer k, and Nkv viewings for the vth visit of consumer k. Then, we formulate
the utility as
Ukvn = ΓvnXk,v,n−1 + kvn, kvn ∼ G(0, 1). (1)
Ukvn = (UkvnS, UkvnP , UkvnL, UkvnN) is a vector of the utilities associated with four
states, “Search”, “Purchase”,“Leave”, and “Not Purchase”.
Xkvn−1 is a vector of independent variables denoted as
Xkv,n−1 = (1, dkv,n−1, τkv,n−1, νkv,n−1, ωkv,n−1, v, n− 1)′,
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where dkv,n−1 is the discount rate, τkv,n−1 the inter-arrival time for resuming search(revisit
time), νkv,n−1 the inter-arrival for page-to-page transition, and ωkv,n−1 the cumulative
page view time of v-th visit. Note that
ωkvn = ωkv,n−1 + νkvn.
Γvn is a 4× 6 parameter matrix associated with the dependent variables Xkvn−1.
We observe only decisions (equivalently states), not utilities. It is natural to
assume that a consumer chooses the state that will bring out maximum utility. Then,
we can associate the consumer’s selection on the next state with the latent utilities
as follows:
Ykvna =
 1 if Ukvna = maxb{UkvnbI(a(k, v, n− 1), b), 0}0 otherwise (2)
a(k, v, n) ∈ {S, P, L,N} is the state of consumer k on page n of visit v, i.e. a(k, v, n) =
b ∈ A such that Ykvnb = 1. Matrix I(i, j) indicates that the corresponding transition
from i to j is allowed. I(a(k, v, n−1), b) indicates whether the transition from current
state a(k, v, n − 1) to state b is possible. For example, the transition from “Search”
to “Search” is allowed, i.e. I(S, S) = 1, but the direct transition from “Search” to
“Not Purchase” is not allowed, i.e. I(S,N) = 0.
Consumer utilities Ukvn are defined as linear functions of search characteristics
Xk,v,n−1 and error terms kvn. Assuming Gumbel distributed errors, we model the
consumer choices Ykvna with hierarchical logit models. By fitting Ykvna on Xk,v,n−1,
we estimate the effects of consumer search characteristics on consumer choices.
2.3.2 Dynamics of Customer Decisions
We have modeled the consumer utilities and the corresponding decisions. Consumer
decisions, Ykvn, are based on the current state a(k, v, n − 1) and underlying utilities
Ukvn. Consumer utilities, Ukvn, are determined by the current search, Xkv,n−1. Con-
sequently, the search result Xkv,n−1 based on the current state a(k, v, n− 1) leads to
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the next decision Ykvn, which, in fact, indicates the next state a(k, v, n).
If we redefine the consumer search state as (Xkv,n, a(k, v, n)), the next state de-
pends only on the present state, not on the past states. Thus, we may define
search and purchase decisions as Markov chains. To see this, let us decompose
(Xkv,n, a(k, v, n)). The present search result Xkv,n−1 is characterized by a discount
rate, search depth (pages, visits), and time between searches (intra- and inter- visit
durations). Search depth and a(k, v, n) define the state where customer k is on the
discrete occasions. The intra- and inter- visit durations characterize inter-arrival
times of consumers’ decision transitions.
Specifically, let Mk(t, dk) denote a Markov chain corresponding to the consumer
k’s state at time t parameterized by discount rate dk. As other continuous Markov
chains, Mk(t, dk) is characterized by (1)state space, (2) transition probabilities, and
(3) inter-arrival times.
2.3.2.1 Page-to-page Transitions
The discrete state of the Markov chain is search depth and search state, i.e.,(v, n, a).
Transitions between states are derived from three sequential stages of binary decisions:
(1) whether to request an additional page or to exit the site, (2) whether to purchase
once ending the search, and (3) whether to come back after ending the search without
purchase. For example, if a consumer requests an additional page, the number of page
views increases by one with the state unchanged (“Search”). When a consumer comes
back later, the number of visits increases by one and the consumer transits from state
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“Leave” to “Search”. We identify possible transitions as
Page request : (v, n, S)→ (v, n+ 1, S)
Purchase : (v, n, S)→ (v, n, P )
Exit without purchase : (v, n, S)→ (v, n, L)
No purchase : (v, n, L)→ (v, n,N)
Revisit : (v, n, L)→ (v + 1, 1, S).
The discrete transition probabilities follow the above transitions. First, let us
define
• fk : probability of ending search
• pk : probability of purchase conditional on ending search
• bk : probability of revisiting.
Then, we can find the probabilities associated with the above possible transitions:
P{Mk = (v, n+ 1, S)|Mk = (v, n, S)} = 1− fk
P{Mk = (v, n+ 1, P )|Mk = (v, n, S)} = fkpk
P{Mk = (v, n, L)|Mk = (v, n, S)} = fk(1− pk)
P{Mk = (v, n,N)|Mk = (v, n, L)} = 1− bk
P{Mk = (v + 1, 1, S)|Mk = (v, n, L)} = bk.
2.3.2.2 Time Durations
There are two types of time durations between transitions. Page view time, νkvn, is
corresponding to transitions from Search state. Next, inter-arrival times for resuming
search (Revisit time), τkvn, are associated with Leave state.
17
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Figure 4: Distribution of page view durations
• Page View Time
Figure 4 shows the distribution of page-view durations. We observe that ma-
jority of consumers spend less than 5 seconds in viewing each page and the
frequency of consumers decreases over page view time. We model conditional
page view time with state-dependent heterogeneous exponential distributions.
Indeed, a large body of literature on purchase-timing decisions in recent years
has used the proportional hazard model, which is based on exponential dis-
tribution families (see e.g. Allenby et al. (1999), Jain and Vilcassim (1991),
18
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and Seetharaman and Chintagunta (2003)). We define the probability that
consumer k spends more than t at each page as
P{Mk(t+ s) = (v, n, S)|Mk(t) = (v, n, S)} = e−λkt.
This probability is conditional that consumer k decided whether to request
additional pages or not. Then, integrating the conditional page-view duration
with consumer decisions, we find the unconditional transition rates between
states. As illustrated in Figure 2.3.2.1, consumer k decides to keep searching
with rate λk(1−fk), to purchase with rate λkfkpk, or to leave with rate λfk(1−
pk). Equivalently, unconditional purchase cycle is exponentially distributed
with rate λkfkpk and total duration within a visit is also exponential with
rate λkfk(1 − pk). Note that transition probabilities fk, pk are dependent on
each consumer’s search characteristics, so are the unconditional (page request -
purchase - revisit) decision cycles.
On the one hand, we may assume that the rate for page-view durations, λk = λ,
is constant. We can find the maximum likelihood estimator of the constant rate
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λ as follows:
λˆ =
∑K
k=1
∑Vk
v=1Nkv∑K
k=1
∑Vk
v=1
∑Nkv
n=1 νkvn
On the other hand, consumers can change the way they browse a site as they
request and view additional pages. We investigate the effects of search depth
on page-view durations. If there were time constraints on Internet usage, we
expected search depth to have negative effects on page-view duration. Learning
effects also may cause negative relations between search depth and page-view
durations. In contrast, if visitors became more involved as they requested more
pages, we expected search depth to be associated with longer page-view time.
Therefore, we may extend the model to allow the inter-arrival rate λk = λvn to
depend on the number of page views n and visits v.
• Revisit Time
Next, consider the time until a consumer decides to come back after leaving the
site. Figure 5 implies that we may model the conditional inter-arrival time for
consumer k to revisit with exponential distributions. As in the case of page-view
time, first we may suppose that the inter-arrival rate for revisit is constant, i.e.
µk = µ. We can find the maximum likelihood estimator of the constant rate µ:
µˆ =
∑K
k=1
∑Vk
v=1Nkv∑K
k=1
∑Vk
v=1
∑Nkv
n=1 τkvn
Also, we investigate the effects of repeat visits on inter-visit time by modeling
the inter-visit rate as dependent on the number of visits, i.e. µk = µv
Repeat visitors may have different motivations to come back. Some of them are
highly goal-oriented with an immediate purchase in mind. Some are building
knowledge and may need longer inter-visit durations. Figure 5 suggests that
inter-visit durations are very disperse, ranging from less than one hour to six
months. We therefore extend the model to allow heterogeneous arrival rates
20
across consumers. We suppose that µk is Gamma-distributed with parameter θ
and δ. Then, the distribution of any inter-arrival time τ is
P{τk < t|µk} = 1− e−µkt
P{τ < t} =
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− e−µkt)dF (µk)
= 1− (t/(t+ θ))−δ.
From the above distribution, we obtain the maximum likelihood estimators for
θ and δ. The resulting likelihood function is written as
L =
K∏
k=1
Vk∏
v=1
[(
τkv
τkv + θ
)−δ−1(
δθ
(τkv + θ)2
)]
.
On the other hand, many researchers including Chatterjee et al. (2003), Hoff-
man and Novak (1996), and Moe (2003), discuss two distinct categories of
consumption behavior: goal-oriented (directed) and experiential (exploratory)
consumer behaviors. Consumers who revisit after relatively short durations are
likely to be more goal-oriented than consumers who revisit after relatively longer
intervals. Moreover, goal-oriented consumer behaviors result in, if any occur,
immediate purchase. Some highly-engaged consumers may need just a few min-
utes or hours to make sure that price offer is good enough, or simply to get
a credit card. Others may need much more time to explore other alternatives.
We then assume two consumer populations: with short inter-visit time and long
inter-visit time. Specifically, with probability α, consumer k is a short-duration
type, whose inter-arrival rate is gamma distributed with parameter θs and δs.
Other consumers have long revisit time, of which inter-arrival rate is gamma
distributed with θl and δl.
µk ∼
 Gamma(θs, δs) w.p. αsGamma(θl, δl) w.p. 1− αs
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Then, the distribution of any inter-arrival time follows as
P{τ < t} = αs
(
1− (t/(t+ θs))−δs)+ (1− αs)(1− (t/(t+ θl))−δl).
The maximum likelihood estimators can be found from the following likelihood
function
L =
K∏
k=1
Vk∏
v=1
[
αs
(
τkv
τkv + θs
)−δs−1( δsθs
(τkv + θs)2
)
+(1− αs)
(
τkv
τkv + θl
)−δl−1( δlθl
(τkv + θl)2
)]
.
These revisit rates are conditional that consumer k decided whether to come back
or not. Therefore, as in models of page view rates, we find the unconditional transi-
tion rates after leaving the site, which is illustrated in Figure 2.3.2.1. Unconditional
revisit cycle is exponentially distributed with rate µkbk. Again, notice that transi-
tion probability bk is dependent on each consumer’s search characteristics, so is the
unconditional revisit cycle.
2.4 Results
We apply Markov chain model to the search behavior of our sample of web site
visitors. The transition probabilities (or consumers’ binary decisions) are estimated
using hierarchical logit models. For inter-arrival times between decisions, we estimate
the exponential rates. We now present the model results.
2.4.1 Customer Decisions
We apply logit models to three stages of consumer binary decisions (Exit-Purchase-
Revisit) and find transition probabilities associated with the three decisions, fk, pk,
and bk. Table 4 reports the analysis of consumers’ decisions using Equations (1) and
(2). Parameter estimates for Γvn and p-values are given for independent variables of
Xkvn. The parameter estimates of the proposed model are significant and in the ex-
pected direction (see Table 1). While fitting the model, we have used evenly balanced
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samples. For example, to predict pk, we have random-sampled equal numbers of pur-
chasing and non-purchasing observations - with the equal sample size of 332 each.
Then, taking evenly balanced and large samples into account, we may say reported
Pseudo-R2’s reflect a good model fit overall.
Table 4: Transition probabilities of consumer decisions: Regression coefficients
Effects Variables fk pk bk
Price d -.346 1.441 .879
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Inter-visit Durations τ .002 -.0112
(.000) (.038)
Page-view Durations ν -2621.080
(.000)
ω 8254.683
(.000)
Repeated Visits 1{v=1} -.760 1.516 1.295
(.000) (.000) (.000)
1{v=2} -.786 2.519 2.159
(.000) (.000) (.000)
1{v=3} -.832 1.792 1.923
(.000) (.000) (.000)
1{v>3} -.816 2.108 3.168
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Page Requests n −2.407∗ .124 .187
(.000) (.002) (.000)
constant .874 -1.783 -1.396
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 29802 664 7162
LL -17063.912 -369.314 -3959.228
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.198 0.203
Table 5 reports the fit statistics for three transition probabilities. Notice that the
hit rates are more than 60% in all transition probabilities. More than 60% of hit
rates are considered as a significant improvement in 50-50 chances of binary choices.
As a measure of model adequacy, we have computed out-of-sample predictive per-
formances. We observe almost no differences in hit rates between in-samples and
out-of-samples. For purchase and revisit probabilities (pk, bk), out-of-sample hit rates
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Table 5: Model fit: Prediction success table for consumer decisions
First-order M.C. Second-order M.C.
Prob. Hit Rate Log Likelihood Hit Rate Log Likelihood Observations
fk In-sample 60.76% -17063.912 60.91% -16949.631 29802
Out-of-sample 60.49% -7353.521 60.76% -7355.446 12752
pk In-sample 62.62% -369.314 62.86% -367.341 664
Out-of-sample 64.11% -146.970 64.15% -151.023 284
bk In-sample 62.68% -3959.228 62.90% -3940.398 7162
Out-of-sample 63.03% -1670.850 63.28% -1662.035 3072
are slightly higher than in-sample rates. We suspect this is due to skewness toward
no-purchase and no-revisit observations. Since majority of observations fall in non-
purchasing and non-revisiting searches, the logit models are likely to predict toward
those directions. The bias may aggravate with small sample sizes, which is the case
of out-of-sample predictions.
While modeling consumer decisions, we have assumed that the corresponding
utilities are determined by present search characteristics only (first-order Markov
chain model). In order to verify this assumption, we also model second-order Markov
chains, where consumer utilities are dependent on the present and previous searches.
Table 5 indicates no significant differences in model fit (log likelihood) and prediction
performance (out-of-sample hit rate). This supports our assumption that consumer
choices are primarily influenced by the current search.
2.4.1.1 Price Effects
Table 4 shows significant relations between discount rates (price) and consumer en-
gagement. As we have expected (see Table 1), higher discount rates involve higher
purchase and revisit propensities (engagement) and lower exit probabilities (disen-
gagement). Although the price effects on consumer engagement seem apparent, we
still cannot avoid endogeneity in the suggested logit model. One might argue that if
high discount rate is a result of strong consumer engagement, i.e. repeated visits and
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page requests, the price effect (especially on exit decisions) may not be obvious as it
seems in the results.
Table 6: Testing for endogeneity of price: Regression results
Effects Variables d pk
Inter-visit Durations τ -.0000454 -.0114
(.535) (0.033)
Page-view Durations ν 49.7505
(.000)
Repeated Visits 1{v=1} .0485 2.0998
(.000) (0.011)
1{v=2} .0605 3.2440
(.000) (0.002)
1{v=3} .0850 2.8223
(.000) (0.052)
1{v>3} .1164 3.4945
(.000) (0.065)
Page Requests n .00294 0.1645
(.000) (0.015)
constant .3971 2.9692
(.000) (0.643)
d -10.4617
(0.514)
Residual ξ̂ 11.880
(0.458)
Observations 42554 664
R2 0.0223 0.1982
To verify Hypothesis C1, we investigate the endogeneity of discount rates. Suppose
that discount rates are correlated with other variables as follows:
d = pi0 + pi1τ + pi2ν + pi31{v=1} + pi41{v=2} + pi51{v=3} + pi61{v>3} + pi7n+ ξ (3)
Table 6 reports the regression result. Although we may observe that repeated visits
and page requests have significant effect on discount rates, very low R2 implies that
we may reject the endogeneity. More specifically, we test for endogeneity following
Wooldridge (2005). If the discount rate d is an endogenous variable, for example, in
the following regression of purchasing probability pk, the error term ξ for discount
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rate d in equation (3) be correlated with  in equation (3). The easiest way to test
this is to include ξ as an additional regressor in equation (4). Since ξ is not observed,
we may use residuals ξ̂ estimated from equation (3).
pk = γ0 + γ1τ + γ2ν + γ31{v=1} + γ41{v=2} + γ51{v=3} + γ61{v>3} + γ7n
+σ1d + σ2ξ̂ +  (4)
The last column in Table 6 represents regression of purchase probability pk on the
residuals ξ̂ for discount rates. The p-value (=0.458) for ξ̂ allows us to reject the
endogeneity of discount rates. We may conclude that consumer search activities may
not have significant effects on discount rates, which means that discount rates may
not change over repeated searches. High correlation (=0.74) of discount rates between
consecutive searches also supports this idea.
2.4.1.2 Intra-visit Effects
Both page requests n and page-view durations ν significantly impact the probability
of exiting the site fk. Table 4 shows that the coefficients of n and ν are negative, as ex-
pected. Consumers develop a tendency to become loyal to the Web site as they search
more and spend more time in viewing a page. This positive effect of intra-visit ex-
posures on consumer engagement is also consistent with within-site lock-in suggested
by Bucklin and Sismeiro (2003) and Zauberman (2003). Although page-view dura-
tion does not have a significant impact on purchase and revisit probabilities, search
depth still increases these probabilities. This further supports C2, our hypothesis on
positive effects of search depth and page-view time on consumer loyalty.
Estimating exit probability fk, we control for visit duration ω, which refers to
the total time spent during a visit. The positive and significant coefficients of visit
duration implies that there might be time constrains in browsing behavior. Consumers
trade off total time spent and exit decisions. Although time constraints attenuate
the “stickiness”, results from purchase and revisit models allow us to support our
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hypothesis on positive intra-visit effects on consumer engagement.
2.4.1.3 Inter-visit Effects
The positive coefficients of repeated visits on purchase and revisit as well as negative
signs on exit indicate that consumers build commitment and loyalty as they frequently
visit the site. This result is consistent with a lot of research on off-line and on-
line marketing including Bucklin and Sismeiro (2003), Chatterjee et al. (2003), and
Johnson et al. (2003). Table 4 shows that the longer it takes for consumers to
come back, the less likely they are to purchase and request additional pages. This
result is consistent with our hypothesis C3 that repeated visits and short inter-visit
durations increase purchase and revisit propensities and decrease exit propensities.
As Bucklin and Sismeiro (2003), Chatterjee et al. (2003), and Moe (2003) have
suggested, consumers who revisit after relatively short durations are likely to be more
goal-oriented. The fact that a highly goal-directed consumer revisits the site reflects
his/her commitment and loyalty.
2.4.2 Time Durations
2.4.2.1 Intra-visit Durations
While predicting exit probability fk, we have found that total time spent during a
visit has positive effects on fk. Consumer may cope with self-imposed or externally
imposed time constraints. Figure 6 also shows that page view time tends to decrease
over page requests and visits.
The results from the page view time estimation further support time constraints
or learning on internet browsing. Table 7 and Figure 2.4.2.1 report the fit of three
different models discussed in Section 2.3.2.2 When we allow λ to depend on n, the
number of page views, log likelihood improves, while it seems almost unchanged with
repeated visits. Page view time is shortened as consumers request additional pages,
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Figure 6: Cumulative distributions of page view times by page requests and visits
but it does not show significant differences over visits. We may conclude that time
constraints or learning effects due to repeated searches be valid within a visit.
In the previous section, we have learned that repeated searches and long page
view time tend to increase consumer engagement, making consumer request addi-
tional pages, purchase, and revisit. These inter-visit exposure effects is attenuated
by time constraints or learning as page view time decreases over repeated page re-
quests. Therefore, we may expect inter-visit activities to have even greater impacts
on consumer stickiness than they are shown in Table 4.
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Table 7: Model fit: Three different models for exponential rates of page view time
Model Log Likelihood
Constant λ -16314.6
λk = λn -15230.8
λk = λvn -15219.6
Number of Observations 22000
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2.4.2.2 Inter-visit Durations
In section 5.2.2., we have proposed three models for inter-visit rate: (1) constant rate,
(2) heterogeneous rate over one consumer population, and (3) two heterogeneous pop-
ulations. The second model allows consumers to have different motivations to revisit,
which are revealed in heterogenous inter-visit rates with Gamma distribution. The
third models is based on a large body of marketing literature that explore two dis-
tinct categories of consumer behaviors: goal-oriented and experiential consumptions.
In this extension, we model inter-visit rates with the composition of two Gamma
distribution
We report the fit of three models in Table 8 and Figure 2.4.2.2. We see a large
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discrepancy between constant rate and heterogeneous rate models. Moreover, results
support our assumption on two distinct motivations for revisit.
Table 8: Model fit: Three different models for inter-visit rate
Model Log Likelihood
Constant µ -26002.0
µk ∼ Gamma(θ, δ) -19330.5
µk ∼ αGamma(θs, δs) + (1− α)Gamma(θl, δl) -17936.5
Number of Observations 5117
Time between Visits (days)
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CHAPTER III
INTER-TEMPORAL SEARCH AND PURCHASE
DECISIONS OF STRATEGIC BUYERS
3.1 Search Theory
3.1.1 Model Development
We present the model in the context of a consumer searching for a ticket for a limited
period of time. The model considers the decision of how intensely search for a ticket
and what ticket to buy given the outcomes of the search. A buyer has K periods
to find a ticket and we denote each discrete period by k (k ≤ K). The intensity
of the search in period k is denoted by sk, where sk ∈ [0, 1]. At any period, the
utility of not having a ticket (or quitting the search process altogether) is denoted u.
The intensity of search, sk, determines the probability of receiving a quote from the
market, pk, which is the best price available at time k in the market.
1
In each period, a buyer may have several options to choose from. We assume
some distribution Fk over the available options at time k. The consumer incurs cost
−c(sk) if he/she wants to receive a quote with probability sk. We assume that the
cost function is increasing, convex and equals 0 if search is not pursued. If quote
pk is received, the consumer decides to either keep it or to wait until tomorrow
and receives expected utility vk+1. If no quote is received, which may occur with
probability (1− sk), the consumer has no choice but to wait, keeping expected utility
vk+1. The decision rule of what quote to keep is simple, buy the best alternative if
the expected utility from the alternative is above the expected utility of waiting an
1There are other ways to model the search process when several alternatives are available. The
main qualitative results of the model are preserved under these alternative hypotheses. We use this
model for its simplicity.
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extra period. Given this rule and the fact that search intensity does not affect that
distribution of alternatives, we can determine the expected utility at time t as follows:
vk(x) = −c(sk) + skEmax{x− pk, vk+1(x)}+ (1− sk)vk+1(x),
where x is the reservation value of the product.
Using some algebra, we can rewrite the original problem as:
vk(x) = −c(sk) + sk
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x− pk − vk+1)dFk + vk+1(x)
= −c(sk) + skQk(x− vk+1) + vk+1(x)
where Qk(x − vk+1) is the average gain from purchasing conditional on searching at
time k. Note that ∂Qk/∂x ≥ 0; ∂Qk/∂vk+1 ≤ 0. Since the expected net utility from
search should be at least zero, i.e. −c(sk) + skQk(x − vk+1) ≥ 0 for all vk+1 and
c(0) = 0, it must be the case that vk ≥ vk+1. This implies that as time progresses,
the net utility, x−vk+1, increases and therefore the probability of accepting the quote
increases. An observable implication of this result is that demand will be more price
inelastic as time progresses.
The assumptions made so far already allow us to derive some interesting results
if price distributions are stationary and therefore Fk = F . The optimal intensity of
search should equate the marginal cost of search with the expected marginal benefit
of search: c′(st) =
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x− pk − vk+1)dFk. This implies that with the stationary
price distributions, the intensity of search should increase with time. To see this,
notice that
∫ x−vk
0
(x − pk − vk)dFk ≤
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x − pk − vk+1)dFk ≥ 0 since the area
of integration increases and vk is monotone decreasing. Since the cost function is
increasing in s, we must conclude that sk ≤ sk+1.
Using the above consumer utility, we can also derive the purchase probability
conditional on search, denoted by blk and often called book-to-look ratio in industry
practice. A consumer accepts a quote if the net utility from the alternative is greater
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than the expected utility of waiting another period, which leads to the book-to-look
ratio as
blk(x) = Pr(x− pk ≥ vk+1(x)) = Fk(x− vk+1).
The unconditional purchase probability bk(x) follows the book-to-look and search
intensity, that is,
bk(x) = sk(x)Pr(x− pk ≥ vk+1(x)) = sk(x)Fk(x− vk+1).
Taking monotonicity of sk and vk into account, we summarize the properties of
book-to-look, search intensity, and booking probability as follows:
F (x− vk+1) = blk(x) > blk−1(x) = F (x− vk)
c′−1
(
Q
(
x− vk+1
))
= sk(x) > sk−1(x) = c′−1
(
Q
(
x− vk
))
sk(x)blk(x) = bk(x) > bk−1(x) = sk−1(x)blk−1(x)
Since consumers observe the expected gain from search, Qk(x − vk+1) decreas-
ing over time, they are more likely to search and purchase. Intuitively, as deadline
comes closer, consumers feel possible alternatives diminishing and become even more
impatient.
Figure 9 represents the average book-to-look ratio and number of searches by
weeks from departure. As a whole, book-to-look increases by almost 30%, which im-
plies consumers change the way they search and purchase over time. This supports
our assumption that consumer behaviors are strategic in the sense that consumers
make decisions based on the evolution of their valuations and prices over time. If
consumers are myopic, their decisions are based on the current set of available fares
and their valuations. They don’t develop expectations on future prices, even with-
out having to wait and possibly purchase in the future. Thus, myopic consumers
will not change their purchase behavior over time. While the number of searches
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almost monotonically increase, book-to-look tend to decrease during the last week.
We attempts to capture the differential effects on this phenomenon.
Before going further, we want to point out the relevance of search data. What
we observe from data is the number of searches, not search probabilities. Suppose
that there are initially n0 number of consumers in the market, in which we see n0s1
number of searches and n0s1bl1 consumer purchases. Then, in the second period,
with n0(1− s1bl1) remaining consumers, we observe n0(1− s1bl1)s2 search activities.
As consumers leave after purchasing over time, the number of searches becomes a
complicated function of search intensities and book-to-look’s. However, the number
of searches has an important implication on search intensities – increasing number
of searches means increases in search intensities. To see this, suppose that searches
n0(1− s1bl1)s2 in the second period is greater than the initial search activities n0s1.
This is equivalent to
n0(1− s1bl1)s2 ≥ n0s1 ⇐⇒ s2 ≥ s1
(1− s1bl1) = s1,
which means increasing search intensity. Since our data shows increasing search
activities, we may conclude that consumers search intensities increase as well.
3.1.2 Evolution of Price Distribution
First, we verify the assumption on stationary price distributions. Figure 10 shows
that both mean price and price dispersion increase – especially during the last period.
We investigate the effects of increasing price dispersion and mean price on search and
purchase probabilities. On the other hand, the complete changes in the underlying
price distributions discourage us to analyze the price evolution effects. Throughout
this section, we assume that the underlying price distribution should be of the same
type while changes in mean and dispersion are allowed.
• Mean-preserving spread
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The book-to-look Fk(x − vk+1) decreases with a mean-preserving spread over
Fk. Intuitively, given the same mean price, consumers face more price volatility.
Although consumers may have better opportunities to see low prices, at the
same time the chances of getting high prices will be even higher. Since purchase
decision is determined by the cut-off price that his/her reservation utility (x−
vk+1) exceeds, book-to-look concerns the upper tail probability or the odds
of getting high prices. Therefore, with all things constant, The more volatile
prices become, the less likely consumers are to purchase. Furthermore, a mean-
preserving spread has same effects on search intensity. All things constant, the
average gain from search, Qk(x) =
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x−pk−vk+1)dFk(pk), decreases with
a mean-preserving spread over Fk, which reduces search propensities. That is,
an increase in the price dispersion discourages not only purchase but also search
propensities.
These findings, however, have more complicated effects on inter-temporal search
and purchase behaviors. Recall that net utilities (x − vk+1) should always in-
crease over time. While the increase in consumer utilities enhances both search
and purchase propensities over time, an increase in price volatility attenuates
these positive effects.
On the other hand, Figure 9 shows mixed results on search and book-to-look.
Until the last period, price dispersions and mean prices seem stationary, in
which both search and purchase activities are increasing over time. However,
in the last period, the book-to-look decreases whereas the increasing search
intensity persists. This phenomenon may happen if the average gain from search
Qk(x) =
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x − pk − vk+1)dFk(pk), increases due to increasing net utility
(x−vk+1) and at the same time, Fk(x−vk+1) – the chances of getting low prices
– decreases even faster than vk+1. Intuitively, the book-to-look may go down if
the tail of Fk is dramatically getting fatter.
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The question is whether price volatility can reverse increasing trend of purchase
and thus actually reduces the purchase propensities over time. The following
simple example of two-period decisions shows that it can occur.
Example 3.1.2.1 Mean-preserving spread
Consider the following price distributions over two periods.
p1 =
 p w.p. βp w.p. 1− β
p2 =

p−  w.p. 1
2
β
p+  w.p. 1
2
β
p−  w.p. 1
2
(1− β)
p+  w.p. 1
2
(1− β)
where 0 < p−  < p < x < p+  < p−  < p < p+ .
Note that E[p1] = E[p2] and V ar[p1] + 
2 = V ar[p2]. Consumers’ search cost
function is defined as c(s) = c2.
Then, the search and the book-to-look probability in each period are found as
v1 =
β2
4
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)2
+ v2 ≥ v2
s1 =
β
2
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)
≤ s2
bl1 = P{x− p1 > v2} = β > bl2
and
v2 =
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2
s2 =
β(x− (p− ))
4
bl2 =
β
2
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In this example, the right tail of prices distributions becomes much fatter.
Specifically, the probability of getting high prices increases dramatically from
(1 − β) to (1 − β
2
). Thus, the book-to-look declines over time (from β to β
2
)
while the average gain from search increases due to reduced reservation utility
vk ≥ vk+1.
• Increasing mean (with constant dispersion)
Given the same distribution types and constant volatility in prices, an increase
in mean prices has the same effect as a mean-preserving spread. We expect
that both book-to-look Fk(x − vk+1) and search intensity c′−1
(
Qk
(
x − vk+1
))
diminish as the distribution shifts toward high prices. Thus, the shift of the
price distribution attenuates increasing propensities of search and purchase.
The following example demonstrates that increasing mean price may induce
decreasing book-to-look.
Example 3.1.2.2 Increasing Mean (with constant dispersion)
p1 =
 p w.p. βp w.p. 1− β
p2 =
 p+  w.p. βp+  w.p. 1− β
where p < p+  < p < x < p+  ≤ 1.
Consumers’ search cost function is defined as c(s) = c2.
v1 =
((
(x− p− v2) + β(p− p)
)
2
)2
+ v2
s1 =
((
(x− p− v2) + β(p− p)
)
2
)
bl1 = 1
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and
v2 =
(
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
)2
s2 =
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
bl2 = β.
We see the book-to-look decreasing over time. Furthermore, with specific values
of p, p, x,  and β, search intensity may increase, i.e. s1 ≤ s2 (see Appendix).
3.1.3 Demand Uncertainty
We have learned that the evolution of price distributions may contribute to declin-
ing book-to-look. In this section, we consider demand uncertainty to explain the
mixed results on inter-temporal search and purchase behaviors. Let us define de-
mand certainty, α, as the probability that a consumer actually ends up with needing
the product. We start our analysis with a two-period problem. Indeed, our data
show that the changes in consumers’ search and purchase behaviors occur in the last
period, which implies that our assumption on two-periods may be sufficient. We can
solve consumers’ decision problems backward.
• Last period (k = 2)
Consumers, offered p2, make decisions on whether to purchase or not. At this
time, they knows whether they will actually need the product. That is, the
demand uncertainty is resolved. Without loss of generality, assume that the
utility associated with no purchase is zero.
In the last period, if they didn’t purchase in the advance period, they will have
to purchase the product with probability α. Then, consumers need to maximize
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their expected utility over their search efforts.
v2(x) = max
s
{−c(s) + sEp2 [max{(x− p2), 0}] + (1− s) · 0}
= max
s
{−c(s) + s( ∫ x
0
(x− p2)dF2(p2)
)}
= max
s
{−c(s) + sQ2(x)}
Remember that ∂Qk(a)
∂a
= Fk(a).
v2(x) = −c(s2) + s2Q2
(
x
)
s2(x) = c
−1
1
(
Q2
(
x
))
b2(x) = s2(x)F2(x) = c
−1
1
(
Q2
(
x
))
F2(x)
bl2(x) = F2(x)
• Advance period (k = 1)
If they purchase in this period (advance purchase), their expected utility is
(x− p1)α− p1(1− α) = αx− p1.
If they don’t purchase, the expected utility is just αv2(x, α). Since they simply
procrastinate, they get the utility of waiting another period, αv2(x, α), in which
the outcome of future decisions are taken into account.
Considering two options, consumers need to maximize their expected utility
over their search efforts.
v1(x, α) = max
s
{−c(s) + sEp1 [max{αx− p1, αv2(x)}] + (1− s)αv2(x)}
= max
s
{−c(s) + sQ1(αx− αv2(x)) + αv2(x)}
v1(x, α) = −c(s1) + s1Q1
(
αx− αv2
)
+ αv2
s1(x, α) = c
−1
1
(
Q1
(
αx− αv2
))
b1(x, α) = s1(x, α)F1(αx− αv2) = c−11
(
Q1
(
αx− αv2
))
F1(αx− αv2)
bl1(x, α) = F1(αx− αv2)
39
A stationarity assumption on price distributions allow us further intuitions. That
is, let us assume that F1(a) = F2(a),∀a. Note that v2(x) ≥ 0 and Q′′k(a) = fk(a) >
0,∀a, which means Qk is convex. Then, we have the following monotone behaviors:
F2(x) > F1(αx− αv2)
c−11
(
αQ2
(
x
))
= s2(x) > s1(x, α) = c
−1
1
(
Q1
(
αx− αv2
))
s2(x)F2(x) = b2(x) > b1(x, α) = s1(x, α)F1(αx− αv2)
, which implies that book-to-look, search, and purchase propensities all increase.
Even without demand uncertainty, if prices are stationary, we expect higher search
and book-to-look propensities over time. Demand uncertainty enlarges the gap be-
tween two periods. While the unresolved uncertainty in the advance period discour-
ages search and purchase, in the last period, consumers with certain demand only
remain and search even more intensively. We notice that under demand uncertainty,
the actual number of purchases – not book-to-look – may go down in the last period
as consumers without having to purchase have already left. On the other hand, de-
mand uncertainty, if incorporated with heterogenous consumer valuation, may make
average book-to-look decline over time.
Let us consider heterogenous valuation over consumers. For simplicity, we assume
that there are two consumer populations, for example, business and leisure travelers,
with different reservation valuations – high xh and low xl valuation . Furthermore,
their demand uncertainties are αh and αl, respectively. It is reasonable to assume
that high value consumers have higher demand uncertainty (smaller α), i.e. αh < αl.
Without loss of generality, let us further assume αl = 1, which implies that low value
consumers will always end up with wanting the product.
High Valuation Low Valuation
Period Population Book-to-look Population Book-to-look
t = 1 nh F (αhxh − αhv2(xh)) nl F (xl − v2(xl))
t = 2 nh(1− s1(xh, αh)bl1(xh, αh))αh F (xh) nl(1− s1(xl)bl1(xl)) F (xl)
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Suppose there are initially 0 ≤ nh ≤ 1 high valuation and nl low valuation con-
sumers. The ratio of two consumers would change at time t = 2. High value con-
sumers are more likely to purchase and leave in the advance period, i.e. s1(xh, , αh)bl1(xh, , αh) >
s1(xl)bl1(xl). Moreover, high valuation consumers who don’t need the product also
leave the market. Therefore, the ratio of high valuation population will drop at time
t = 2. On the other hand, high value consumers have higher purchase propensities
per search at time t = 2, i.e. F (xh) > F (xl). Consequently, the decrease in the
ratio of high value population reduces the average book-to-look of the last period.
The larger the difference in the valuations and the demand uncertainty are, the more
likely the book-to-look is to decline. The following example demonstrates how the
average book-to-look decreases over time with demand uncertainty and heterogenous
valuations.
Example 3.1.3. Demand uncertainty and heterogeneous consumer valuation (with
stationary price distributions)
Suppose that price distributions are stationary:
p1 = p2 =

0.2 w.p. 0.3
0.3 w.p. 0.5
0.8 w.p. 0.2
with
xl = 0.3, xh = 1, αh = 0.4
nl = 0.8, nh = 0.2
Then, we can find consumers’ search and purchase propensities as follows (see
Appendix for details):
Note that for each consumer population, the book-to-look increases over time. In
each period, high valuation consumers show higher search and purchase propensi-
ties than low valuation consumers. Although low valuation consumers dominate the
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Table 9: An example of inter-temporal search and purchase propensities under
demand uncertainty
t Low Valuation High Valuation Average
1 Population 0.8 Population 0.2
vl1 0.0045 v
h
1 0.1027
sl1 0.0151 s
h
1 0.0589 avg. Search prob. 0.0238
bl1 0.0452 b
h
1 0.0472 avg. Purchase prob. 0.0131
bll1 0.3 bl
h
1 0.8 avg. Book-to-Look 0.4
2 Population 0.796 Population 0.076
vl2 0.00023 v
h
2 0.099
sl2 0.015 s
h
2 0.315 avg. Search prob. 0.04121
bl2 0.0045 b
h
2 0.315 avg. Purchase prob. 0.0316
bll2 0.3 bl
h
2 1 avg. Book-to-Look 0.3611
population over all periods, its proportion becomes even higher. Then, the average
book-to-look in the last period is much more dominated by low valuation consumers.
As a result, the average book-to-look goes down. On the other hand, the average
search and unconditional purchase probabilities rather increases over time because
high valuation consumers, though small in number, search even more intensively in
the last period and account for much of overall search activities.
3.2 The Airline Ticket Market
In recent years, airlines have faced increasing revenue pressures due to the increased
market penetration of low cost carriers, and the prevalence of internet sales. The
emergence of online travel agencies (e.g., Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, etc.) facil-
itated the comparison of prices across airline competitors and the ever-increasing
penetration of low cost carriers (LCCs) that employ very different pricing models
than those used by legacy carriers. Specifically, the majority of LCCs in the U.S.
use one-way pricing, which results in separate price quotes for the departing and
returning portions of a trip. One-way pricing effectively eliminates the ability to seg-
ment business and leisure travelers based on a Saturday night stay requirement (i.e.,
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business travelers are less likely to have a trip that involves a Saturday night stay).
Combine the use of one-way pricing with the fact that the internet has increased the
transparency of prices for consumers and the result is that today, almost half of all
air leisure travelers state that they purchase the lowest price they find when using
online channels (Harteveldt, et al., 2004).
In hindsight, it is clear that the Internet has transformed the travel industry. For
example, in 2007, approximately 55 million (or one in four) US adults traveled by
commercial air and were Internet users (PhoCusWright, 2008). In 2006, more than 365
million US households spent a total of $74.4 billion on leisure travel online (Harteveldt,
2006). In addition, as of 2004, more than half of all leisure travel purchases were made
online (Aaron, 2007). In many ways, the internet has been both a blessing and a curse
for carriers. On one hand, carriers have benefited from lower distribution costs and the
ability to interact directly with consumers (versus relying on an intermediary travel
agency). On the other hand, the internet has not only increased the transparency
of prices for consumers, but for competitors as well. Monitoring competitive prices
and seat availability (a measure of demand on competitors’ flights) is becoming more
common and viable at a large scale. The net result is a highly competitive market
in which the ability to segment customers and price discriminate is becoming more
difficult and price changes are quickly matched by competitors.
3.3 Data
The online search and purchase data for this research was collected over a two-month
period, from October 15, 2007, to December 15, 2007, and targeted to customers
traveling between November 15 and December 15 on one of 55 domestic routes in the
United States.
Table 10 presents summary statistics for the data used in this study. The purchase
conversion rate per search is approximately 3%. The majority of prices shown to
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics
Variables Value
Observations 29095
Number of Markets 55
Departure Dates 31
Number of Searches 248342
Number of Purchases 8847
Average Price 297
Standard Deviation of Price 206
customers were between $150 and $350. The price dispersion is quite high with
standard deviation 206.52.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Basic Results
We first illustrate graphically consumer search and purchase propensities. Figure
9 presents daily average book-to-look ratio and number of searches per route.2 As
deadline comes closer, consumers are more likely to search and purchase overall, which
was discussed in the base model. Consumers who become more impatient over time,
lower their reservation valuations, i.e. vk > vk+1. This consumer impatience leads
to more intensive searches and higher purchase propensities. This trend, however,
changes in the last period, as shown in Figure 9. While strong search propensities
persist till the last period, purchase propensities go down. We have discussed two
possible effects behind this phenomenon – price evolution and demand uncertainty.
In reality, demand uncertainty are hardly observable from aggregate data. Then, the
discussion will be primarily on price evolution.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that both mean and variation of price increase
dramatically during the last two weeks. We have learned that increases in mean price
and price dispersion have negative effects on purchase propensities. In particular,
2Figures are based on sample data. It does not necessarily represent all search activities.
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Figure 9: Book-to-look and search
the upper tail of price distribution may enlarge faster than consumers lower their
reservation utility. As a result, Fk(x−vk+1) – the chances of getting lower prices than
the reservation value – may decrease overall.
3.4.2 Estimates
We find the book-to-look at time t as Pr(x− vk+1 − pk ≥ 0). Assuming pk = µk − k
and a Gumbel-distributed error ξk with mode zero and some scale parameter 1/βk,
we can model the net utility scaled by βk as follows:
uk = βk(x− vk+1 − µk + ξk)
= δk − βkµk + k, k ∼ G(0, 1),
where δk is consumer valuation and k is a standard Gumbel error. Furthermore,
we allow the valuation dependent on the observation i, departure date j, days from
departure k, and the market (route) m. This specifies the net utility as
uijkm = βjkmxijkm − βkµk + ijkm, ijkm ∼ G(0, 1), (5)
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Figure 10: Evolution of mean price and price dispersion
where xkjm is the vector of covariates – dummy variables for market, departure
date, and day of week, weeks from departure, and a constant. Based on the above
consumer utility, we estimate a logit model on Pr(x−vk+1−pk ≥ 0), the probability of
purchase given search controlling for price and price dispersion and a series of dummies
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity of markets or routes. The estimation also
includes interaction terms of price and weeks to departure.
Table 11 reports the regression results based on equation (1).3 The first logit
model assumes that (Gumbel) price distributions are stationary, i.e. µk = µ, for
all k while the second model assumes non-stationary distribution. The log likelihood
indicates a better fit of the non-stationary distribution model. Moreover, the constant
in the first model is not significant with p-value 0.370 because all the variances due
to the changes in price distribution are reflected in the constant. This argues that
the evolution of price distribution has a significant effect on consumers’ purchase
probability.
3The dummy variables for market and departure date are not presented. These dummy variables
are statistically significant overall.
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Figure 11: Evolution of price distribution
The estimation shows that unless for the last week of purchase, demand is down-
ward slopping. More importantly, we confirm that demand becomes more inelastic
as deadline approaches. This is true in all the specification of the model. Note that
this is consistent with our basic model of search but also with the model that has an
added demand uncertainty component. Consistent with search theory as well (and
risk neutrality), we find that price dispersion delays purchase. This effect can only
be explained by the search theoretic reasons.
Model 2 shows that the coefficients on price are significant and decrease overall
in absolute terms. That is, demand becomes less elastic to prices. We expect that
as consumers lower their reservation values over time vk ≥ vk+1, they become more
inelastic to price increase. The rate of price inelasticity growth slows in the last
period. The increase in mean price and price dispersion reduces the consumer utility,
vk(x) = −c(sk) + sk
∫ x−vk+1
0
(x− pk − vk+1)dFk + vk+1(x), since Fk(·) ≤ Fk−1(·). The
reduced consumer utility discourages purchasing, which attenuate price inelasticity.
This result is consistent with decreasing book-to-look ratio in the last period.
We also estimate our model using the assumption that the error term ijkm is
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normal distributed. The result of probit model estimation is compared with logit
models in Table 11. The log likelihood and significance of coefficients improve slightly
in the probit model. This may imply that price might be modeled with normal
distribution, but we cannot conclude the significance of the differences between two
models.
Table 11: Regression Results
Variables Logit 1 Logit 2 Probit
log(price) -.2441 -.4785 -.2878
(.000) (.001) (.000)
log(stdev(price)) -.0791 -.0471 -.0314
(.001) (.061) (.015)
weeks from departure .2357 .69732 .4183
(.000) (.000) (.000)
thanksgiving −.0943 -.2001 -.1393
(.497) (.156) (.071)
log(price)1{w=0} .3938 .2516
(.005) (.000)
log(price)1{w=1} .39161 .2402
(.001) (.000)
log(price)1{w=2} .2305 .1697
(.000) (.000)
log(price)1{w=3} .1657 .1018
(.002) (.001)
log(price)1{w=4} .0667 .0409
(.066) (.043)
constant −.2280 -1.3667 -.8661
(.370) (.001) (.000)
Observations 86960 86960 86960
LL -26159.114 -26059.697 -26038.224
We restricted our model on leisure markets (routes between major cities and Or-
lando) and business markets (routes between industry-based cities). Table 12 reports
logit estimation results. We observe that the price elasticity monotonically decreases
over time until the last period. This result may be explained from the perspective of
price evolution and demand uncertainty. First, as illustrated in Figure 12 and Figure
13, price dispersions do not show dramatic changes over time, especially in business
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markets. Relatively small and stationary price distributions may cause reservation
valuation to keep decreasing vk ≥ vk+1, which result in monotonic decrease in de-
mand elasticity. Next, we consider demand uncertainty and heterogenous consumer
valuations. In leisure and business markets, consumers may be more homogenous in
terms of demand uncertainty and reservation valuations. Thus, we expect demand
uncertainty may have smaller effects on book-to-look in those markets.
Table 12: Regression Results: Leisure and Business Markets
Variables Leisure Business
log(price) -1.5011 -1.5201
(.000) (.000)
log(stdev(price)) -.1860 .0547
(.009) (.416)
weeks from departure 1.3351 1.3360
(.005) (.005)
thanksgiving .0987 -.1398
(.740) (.719)
log(price)1{w=0} 1.0097 1.1622
(.002) (.015)
log(price)1{w=1} .9049 .9626
(.012) (.014)
log(price)1{w=2} .6819 .6928
(.013) (.022)
log(price)1{w=3} .4339 .4509
(0.019) (.035)
log(price)1{w=4} .2012 .1962
(.049) (.143)
constant .1231 .9367
(.910) (.456)
Observations 28360 7122
LL -5680.540 -3168.638
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Figure 12: Evolution of mean price and price dispersion: Leisure Markets
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Figure 13: Evolution of mean price and price dispersion: Business Markets
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
4.1 Markov Chain Model for Dynamic Search and Pur-
chase Behaviors
The purpose of this research is to model the within-site browsing behavior of con-
sumers both within and across visits. We focused our study on two elements: (1) key
search effects on a series of consumer decisions of page request, purchase, and revisit,
and (2) inter- and intra-visit dynamics of browsing behavior.
First, we observe that within-site search effects – that is, intra-visit activities
(search depth and long page-view durations) as well as inter-visit exposures (repeated
visits and short revisit durations) – lead to strong consumer engagement and thus
increase purchase and revisit propensities. Furthermore, fit comparison between first
and second order continuous markov chain models allows us to conclude that con-
sumer choices are primarily influenced by the current search, independent of the past
searches.
Next, our results indicate that consumers dynamically adjust their browsing be-
havior both within and across visits. There first is evidence for time constraints or
learning effects. Second, our results are consistent with the presence of two distinct
categories of consumer behaviors: goal-oriented and experiential consumptions that
spill over multiple visits.
In this way, paper contributes to literature in online search and purchase behaviors
(1) proposing the search effects within and across visits on consumer engagement (2)
relating the consumer stickiness to a series of consumer decisions on page request, pur-
chase and revisit, and (3) providing a comprehensive view on consumer decisions and
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decision cycles through a continuous Markov chain model that incorporates discrete
choice models with the proportional hazard models.
4.2 Inter-temporal Search and Purchase Decisions of Strate-
gic Buyers
We investigate the search and purchasing behavior of strategic buyers under a dead-
line. We show that time-consistent buyers follow simple behavioral rules based on
future and current prices and options available. At any period, buyers buy a prod-
uct if the derived utility of having exceeds a monotonically decreasing reservation
valuation. We show that the trade-off between waiting and purchasing will become
less and less favorable to waiting. Price elasticity should therefore drop as departure
date approaches. Intuitively, as consumers become more impatient over time, they
lower their reservation valuations. This consumer impatience leads to more intensive
searches and higher purchase propensities.
On the other hand, the data reveal that search does increase as deadline ap-
proaches but that purchases given searches decline. To explain these mixed results
on search and purchase, we extend the base model to allow for price evolution and
demand uncertainty. We find that increases in mean price and price dispersion may
attenuate increasing propensities for search and purchase. Intuitively, the book-to-
look may go down if the tail of price distribution is dramatically getting fatter, which
means the chances of getting high prices increase even faster than the reservation
valuation. We also observe that demand uncertainty incorporated with heterogenous
valuations may have negative effects on consumer search and purchase effects.
We demonstrate our models through a logit model estimation on a unique data
set on search and purchase behavior from an internet search engine. The estimation
shows that unless for the last week of purchase, demand is downward slopping. More
importantly, we confirm that demand becomes more inelastic as deadline approaches.
The rate of price inelasticity growth slows in the last period. The increase in mean
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price and price dispersion of the last period reduces the consumer utility and thus
discourages purchasing, which attenuate price inelasticity. This result is consistent
with decreasing book-to-look ratio in the last period.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF INTER-TEMPORAL SEARCH AND
PURCHASE DECISIONS
Example 3.1.2.1. Mean-preserving spread
p1 =
 p w.p. βp w.p. 1− β
p2 =
 p+  w.p. βp+  w.p. 1− β
where p < p+  < p < x < p+  ≤ 1
Consumers’ search cost function is defined as c(s) = c2.
In the last period,
v2 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp2 [max{(x− p2), 0}]]
= max
s
[
−s2 + s(1
2
β(x− (p− )))]
=
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2
s2 =
β(x− (p− ))
4
b2 =
β(x− (p− ))
4
1
2
β
bl2 =
β
2
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Note that
(x− p) ≥ v2 ⇔ x− p−
(
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
)2
≥ 0
⇔ β2 ≤ 4(x− p)
(x− p− )2
⇔ β ≤ 2
√
x− p
(x− p− ) .
Since 1 < 2
√
x−p
(x−p−) , we have that x− p ≥ v2.
In the advance-purchase period,
v1 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{x− p1, v2}] + (1− s)v2]
= max
s
[−c(s) + s(β(x− p) + (1− β)v2)+ (1− s)v2]
= max
s
[−s2 + s(β(x− p− v2))+ v2]
= max
s
[
−s2 + sβ
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)
+
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2]
=
β2
4
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)2
+
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2
s1 =
β
2
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)
b1 = s2P{x− p1 > v2}
=
β2
2
(
(x− p)−
(
β(x− (p− ))
4
)2)
bl1 = P{x− p1 > v2}
= β
The average book-to-look decreases over time.
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Example 3.1.2.2. Increasing Mean (with constant dispersion)
p1 =
 p w.p. βp w.p. 1− β
p2 =
 p+  w.p. βp+  w.p. 1− β
where p < p+  < p < x < p+  ≤ 1.
Consumers’ search cost function is defined as c(s) = c2.
In the last period,
v2 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{(x− p2), 0}]]
= max
s
[−s2 + sβ(x− (p+ ))]
=
(
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
)2
s2 =
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
b2 = s2β =
β2
(
x− (p+ ))
2
bl2 = β.
Note that
(x− p) ≥ v2 ⇔ x− p−
(
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
)2
≥ 0
⇔ β2 ≤ 4(x− p)
(x− p− )2 .
Since
4(x−p)
(x−p−)2 ≥ 1, we have that x− p ≥ v2.
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Also,
(x− p) ≥ v2 ⇔ x− p−
(
β
(
x− (p+ ))
2
)2
≥ 0
⇔ β2 ≤ 4(x− p)
(x− p− )2 .
Now let
β′ = min{ 2
√
x− p
(x− p− ) , 1}.
In the advance-purchase period,
v1 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{x− p1, v2}] + (1− s)v2]
=
 maxs
[−s2 + s(β(x− p) + (1− β)(x− p))+ (1− s)v2] if β ≤ β′
maxs
[−s2 + s(β(x− p) + (1− β)v2)+ (1− s)v2] if β > β′
=
 maxs
[−s2 + s((x− p− v2) + β(p− p))+ v2] if β ≤ β′
maxs
[−s2 + s(β(x− p− v2))+ v2] if β > β′
=

((
(x−p−v2)+β(p−p)
)
2
)2
+ v2 if β ≤ β′(
β(x−p−v2)
2
)2
+ v2 if β > β
′
s1 =

((
(x−p−v2)+β(p−p)
)
2
)
if β ≤ β′(
β(x−p−v2)
2
)
if β > β′
b1 = s1P (x− p1 > v2)
=

((
(x−p−v2)+β(p−p)
)
2
)
if β ≤ β′(
β2(x−p−v2)
2
)
if β > β′
bl1 =
 1 if β ≤ β
′
β if β > β′
The book-to-look decreases over time.
We also may observe s1 ≤ s2. For example, for x = 0.5, p = 0.1, p = 0.49,  = 0.02
and β = 0.9, s1 = 0.165 < s2 = 0.171.
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Example 3.1.3. Demand uncertainty and heterogeneous consumer valuation (with
stationary price distributions)
Suppose that
p1 = p2 =

p w.p. β1
p′ w.p. β2
p′′ w.p. β3
p w.p. 1− (β1 + β2 + β3)
There are two types of consumers, high (xh) and low(xl) valuation consumers,
where
p < p′ < xl < p′′ < p < xh ≤ 1.
In the last period, the book-to-look of low value consumers is bll2 = P{xl − p2 >
0} = β1 + β2. In the meantime, the book-to-look of high value consumers is blh2 =
P{xh − p2 > 0} = 1.
Specifically,
vl2 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp2 [max{(xl − p2), 0}]]
= max
s
[−s2 + s(β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′))]
=
(
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′)
2
)2
sl2 =
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′)
2
bl2 =
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′)
2
(β1 + β2)
bll2 = β1 + β2
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and
vh2 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{(xh − p2), 0}]]
= max
s
[−s2 + s(β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′) + β3(xl − p′′) + (1− β1 − β2 − β3)(xl − p))]
=
(
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′) + β3(xl − p′′) + (1− β1 − β2 − β3)(xl − p)
2
)2
sh2 =
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′) + β3(xl − p′′) + (1− β1 − β2 − β3)(xl − p)
2
bh2 =
β1(xl − p) + β2 · (xl − p′) + β3(xl − p′′) + (1− β1 − β2 − β3)(xl − p)
2
blh2 = 1.
Note that xl − p ≥ vl2. Assume that xl − p′ ≤ vl2.
In the advance-purchase period,
vl1 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{αlxl − p1, αlvl2}] + (1− s)αlvl2]
= max
s
[−c(s) + s(β1(xl − p) + (1− β1)vl2)+ (1− s)vl2]
= max
s
[−s2 + sβ1(xl − p− vl2)+ vl2]
=
(
β1
(
xl − p− vl2
)
2
)2
+ vl2
sl1 =
β1
(
xl − p− vl2
)
2
bl1 =
β1
(
xl − p− vl2
)
2
β1
bll1 = P{xl − p1 > vl2} = β1
Assume that αhxh − p′′ > vh2 and αhxh − p < vh2 .
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vh1 = max
s
[−c(s) + sEp1 [max{αhxh − p1, αhvh2}] + (1− s)αhvh2 ]
= max
s
[−s2 + s(β1(αhxh − p) + β2(αhxh − p′) + β3(αhxh − p′′) + (1− β1 − β2 − β3)αhvh2)+ (1− s)αhvh2 ]
= max
s
[−s2 + s(β1(αhxh − p− αhvh2 ) + β2(αhxh − p′ − αhvh2 ) + β3(αhxh − p′′ − αhvh2 ))+ αhvh2 ]
=
(
β1(αhxh − p− αhvh2 ) + β2(αhxh − p′ − αhvh2 ) + β3(αhxh − p′′ − αhvh2 )
2
)2
+ αhv
h
2
sh1 =
β1(αhxh − p− αhvh2 ) + β2(αhxh − p′ − αhvh2 ) + β3(αhxh − p′′ − αhvh2 )
2
bh1 = s
h
1P (αhxh − p1 > αhvh2 )
=
β1(αhxh − p− αhvh2 ) + β2(αhxh − p′ − αhvh2 ) + β3(αhxh − p′′ − αhvh2 )
2
(β1 + β2 + β3)
blh1 = P (αhxh − p1 > αhvh2 )
= β1 + β2 + β3
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